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Abstract
The paper studies a general model of hold-up in a setting encompassing
the models of Segal (1999) and Che and Hausch (1999) among others. It is
shown that if renegotiation is modelled as an infinite-horizon non-cooperative
bargaining game then, with a simple initial contract, an efficient equilibrium
will generally exist. The contract gives authority to one party to set the terms
of trade and gives the other party a non-expiring option to trade at these
terms. The difference from standard results arises because the existing contract
ensures that the renegotiation game has multiple equilibria; the multiplicity of
continuation equilibria can be used to enforce efficient investment.
JEL: D23
Keywords: Incomplete Contracts, Hold-up problem, Option Contracts
This is a substantially-revised version of a paper entitled “Efficient Contracts in
Complex Environments”. Thanks are due for helpful discussions and comments to
Ben Polak, and to seminar audiences at Toulouse, Edinburgh, Birmingham and UCL.
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1 Introduction
The classical hold-up problem is that if two individuals who must make relationship-
specific investments might subsequently renegotiate the division of the surplus which
results, they will under-invest because they will not both be able to realize the full
marginal benefit of their investment. The literature on the hold-up problem has
been very fruitful in providing explanations for a variety of economic institutions and
contracting practices such as, for example, vertical integration, property rights and
financial structure of firms (Klein, Crawford and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1979),
Grossman and Hart (1986), Aghion and Bolton (1992)). Some papers have argued
that the hold-up problem can be solved by appropriate contractual design. Most
notably, Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) (see also Chung (1991)) showed that
in some situations the renegotiation game can be altered by contractual devices in
such a way as to induce efficient investment, while No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995) showed
that option contracts may in certain circumstances achieve efficiency. These papers,
however, refer to situations in which, firstly, it is clear ex ante which good should be
traded ex post (i.e., after the uncertainty is resolved) and, secondly, bilateral direct
externalities do not obtain (for example, in a buyer-seller model, it is not the case that
the buyer’s investment affects the seller’s production cost and the seller’s investment
affects the value of the good to the buyer, clearly a strong assumption in many
applications). Che and Hausch (1999) showed that if bilateral direct externalities
are incorporated in the standard model, and if a commitment not to renegotiate the
contract is impossible, then it may be that contracts are able to achieve nothing:
the optimal complete contract is the null contract and the inefficiency caused by the
hold-up problem is severe. Furthermore, Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999)
showed that a similar conclusion obtains if the environment is complex in the sense
that the nature of the good which it will be efficient ex post to trade is not known
and there are many goods which might turn out to be the efficient one.
The purpose of this paper is to argue that simple contracts similar in some ways to
those considered by Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994) (henceforth ADR) and by
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No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1995) can in fact lead to efficiency even when the environment
is complex and when there are bilateral direct externalities. We consider a buyer-seller
model with two-sided investments encompassing, among others, settings of the types
studied by Che and Hausch (1999), Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999). We
adopt the view that there is an exogenously given non-cooperative renegotiation game,
which we take to be an infinite-horizon game: that is, the seller can delay production,
and/or the buyer can delay acceptance of the good, for an indefinite period while
contract renegotiation is going on. The result is that there are simple contracts with
the property that, for a large class of plausible non-cooperative renegotiation games,
there exists an efficient equilibrium. Two important advantages of the contracts which
are used to achieve efficiency are, firstly, that they are very simple and, secondly, that
they do not assume that future contingencies are describable ex ante. They give one
party the authority to set ex post the nature and terms of trade and they give the
other party a non-expiring option whether to trade or not. They may also require one
party to post a bond as a guarantee of good behavior. Although, as noted above, there
are similarities between these contracts and those considered by ADR and No¨ldeke-
Schmidt, there are also significant differences. Whereas in the latter two papers the
default option is set ex ante in the original contract, here it is set ex post by one of the
parties (the one with authority); furthermore, the default trade cannot be enforced
by each party since the one without authority always has the option not to trade.
Similarly, whereas the No¨ldeke-Schmidt model has a finite horizon, so that the option
necessarily has to be exercised by a specific date or not at all, the options considered
here never expire.
More importantly, the logic of the equilibrium considered here is very different
from that found in previous papers. Suppose that the party with authority is the
buyer. After the investments have been made and the uncertainty has been resolved
the buyer’s equilibrium strategy will be to specify an efficient trade. Subsequently,
since trading according to the terms of the existing contract is efficient, there will be
an equilibrium in which there is no renegotiation of the contract and the parties do
indeed trade efficiently on these terms. On the other hand, there will also exist another
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equilibrium in which, essentially, the seller declines to exercise her option and bargains
over a new contract. Since there are multiple equilibria in the continuation game, it is
possible to condition the equilibrium played on the investments which were made in
the first stage, giving both parties the incentive to invest efficiently (depending on the
parameters, it may also be necessary to use a financial hostage to influence the shares
of surplus which the two parties get in renegotiation). Equally, if the buyer abuses his
authority by specifying either an inefficient trade or the wrong terms of trade, he can
be punished by selection of an appropriate continuation equilibrium. The argument
relies on the fact that there are multiple equilibria in the renegotiation game. This
explains the difference between the results of this paper and those of earlier papers:
typically earlier papers assume (often without an explicit non-cooperative analysis)
that the renegotiation game has a unique outcome. Non-cooperative bargaining games
(the Rubinstein game, say) do often have a unique equilibrium. However, we are
dealing here with a game in which there already exists a contract (perhaps a contract
which gives, or may give, an efficient outcome, depending on the moves which the
parties make), but renegotiation can take place according to some given protocol.
This is different from a game in which there is no contract and in which the players,
using the same protocol, have to negotiate an agreement before any surplus can
be realized. For any of the standard bargaining protocols, there will necessarily be
multiple equilibria in the renegotiation game starting with a contract of the type
considered here in force.
The argument relies on an assumption - implicit in the definition of subgame-
perfect equilibrium - that the parties’ behavior (in particular, the resulting distrib-
ution of surplus) can be history-dependent. The view taken here is that, once two
parties have reached an agreement, partly formal (i.e., legally enforceable) and partly
informal, the behavior of each will depend on whether the other has violated the
agreement or not. The alternative view would be that in the absence of a forcing
contract the distribution of surplus should always be independent of history, but
this view, as argued below, is not supported by non-cooperative analysis of plausible
extensive-form games. Nor does it seem to be compatible with empirical or exper-
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imental evidence that an agent’s behavior is always invariant to the past behavior
of the agent with whom he or she is interacting. For example, Kahneman, Knetsch
and Thaler (1986), Bewley (1997) and Borges and Knetsch (1997) provide evidence
that the bargains which customers, employees and experimental subjects are willing
to make depend on the size and nature of sunk costs which have been previously
incurred.
A number of conclusions follow from the analysis. As several of the papers men-
tioned above have found, contracts which are very incomplete (e.g., authority con-
tracts) may in fact be optimal, particularly when renegotiation is allowed. Our results
lend support to this conclusion. Bolton and Rajan (2001) have shown, in an asym-
metric information framework with repeated interaction, that employment contracts
may be optimal. The contracts in the current paper look very like employment con-
tracts since one party gives instructions and the other has the legal right, in effect, to
strike and negotiate for better terms. We find that such contracts are efficient even in
a symmetric information framework which is essentially one-shot (in the sense that
it is a one-off project - only one good is to be produced). We also find (in Section
4) that if it is not possible for the parties to deposit a financial hostage then it is
optimal to give authority to that party which, other things being equal, has relatively
high investment cost or low bargaining power. If the ‘employer’ has high bargaining
power then the threat of a ‘strike’ by the ‘employee’ is too low to give the former the
incentive to invest enough in the relationship. If financial hostages are feasible, then
either party could be given authority.
Secondly, an explicitly non-cooperative analysis may yield different conclusions
from those of standard contract theory. The latter generally assumes either that, as
discussed above, there is a black-box renegotiation process or else that the contract
can effectively design an entire extensive form for the parties to play. Here we assume,
by contrast, that the contract can only overlay an existing non-cooperative game
which the parties play, an approach which Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2002) have
called ‘partial contracting’. The literature on relational contracting (see Macleod
and Malcomson (1989) and Levin (2003)) has a similar outlook. A related point,
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which has been stressed by Watson (2001) is that if the parties can take costly and
irreversible actions as part of the mechanism (as opposed to simply send messages as
in classical contract theory1) then the implementable outcomes will be very different.
Thirdly, we conclude that lack of verifiability is not necessarily an obstacle to
efficient contracting even in those environments in which it has been supposed to be
fatal. Undoubtedly contracting is inefficient in many circumstances but it may be
that the explanation for this is to be found either in asymmetry of information or in a
lack of ex post verifiability2 - here we assume, as does most of the hold-up literature,
that actions are contractible after the uncertainty is resolved.
A recent paper which sets out an argument related to the one made here is Che
and Sakovics (2003). They assume that the parties are able to delay their investment
indefinitely and that bargaining over the surplus goes on while, possibly, investment
gradually takes place. Their result is that even if there is no contract there will be an
asymptotically efficient equilibrium, as the discount factor goes to one. The difference
from the current paper is that we assume, in common with most of the rest of the hold-
up literature, that the investment of the two parties has to be made, simultaneously,
at the outset of the game. It may be, for example, that if the investment is delayed
then other firms will come in and take the market, so that substantial sums have to
be committed at the outset if the project is to have a positive net present value.
Another related paper is Carmichael and MacLeod (2003). They analyze a hold-
up model in which, after investing, the two players play a modified version of the
one-shot Nash demand game. This game has an efficient equilibrium: neither party
wants to reduce his investment below the efficient level because his proportional share
of the ex post surplus would fall. The bargaining game, however, is special. Moreover,
if the two parties do not reach agreement they will presumably re-open negotiations
rather than walk away, i.e., the equilibrium is not renegotiation-proof. The difference
from the current paper is that we show here that if delay in production is possible,
1See Maskin and Moore (1999) for the standard approach to mechanism design with renegotiation.
In this approach, the mechanism delivers an outcome, as a function of messages which are intrinsically
costless, which may be inefficient; if so, renegotiation then takes place to an efficient outcome.
2see Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), chapter 12.
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efficiency is achievable for a wide class of infinite-horizon bargaining games, including
most of those commonly found in the literature.
In section 2 we set out the underlying model. Section 3 considers the case in which
it is possible for one party to make an initial cash deposit (i.e., financial hostage) and
neither party has all the bargaining power. Section 4 considers the case in which a
deposit is not feasible or in which one party has all the bargaining power. In Section 5
we consider a finite-horizon version of the model. In this case, efficiency is achievable
if the parties can invest in sequence. Section 6 has some brief concluding remarks.
2 The Model
There are two risk-neutral players, a buyer (B) and a seller (S). At date 0 (before the
game starts) B and S may sign a contract which is enforceable in court (the court is
a passive agent in the game). This contract, if any, stipulates payments to be made
by B to S as a function of describable and verifiable messages and actions which
the players choose later in the game. First we define a game without renegotiation,
denoted G(α0), α0 being the contract (possibly the null contract) signed at date 0;
the full game played by B and S includes the possibility of renegotiation, as will
be described below. G(α0) begins with an investment stage: at date 1, S and B
each, simultaneously, choose an amount of investment from the set [0,∞). S’s chosen
investment is denoted by is and B’s by ib. The cost of investment is, borne by S, is
ψs(is) and the cost of ib, borne by B, is ψb(ib). ψs and ψb are both strictly increasing,
non-negative functions. After the investments are made a state of the world θ is
randomly realized from a set of possible states Θ. At date 2, S and B both observe
each other’s investments and θ but the court is not able to observe them either now
or later, i.e. is, ib and θ are not verifiable. For each θ ∈ Θ, there is a set A(θ) of
goods which it is feasible for the parties to trade. At date 3 or later, S chooses which
good a ∈ A(θ), if any, to produce3 (i.e., S can produce only one good at most). After
S has produced a, B observes a and decides whether to accept delivery.
3“Produce” is taken to be synonymous with “produce and deliver”. If production and delivery
were modelled as distinct actions, similar results would apply.
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Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite: that is, S can in principle delay for
an indefinite time her decision to produce, and, once S has produced, B can delay
indefinitely his decision to accept delivery. The set of dates at which it is feasible for
S to produce a good is denoted by T and, if S has produced a good at date t ∈ T , the
set of dates at which B can accept delivery is denoted by T ′(t). One possibility, for
example, is that T = {3, 4, 5....} and that T ′(t) = {t+ ², t+ 2², ...} where 0 < ² < 1.
At any date t at which production has not yet taken place, it is always possible to
produce within one period.
The game ends if and when B accepts delivery of S’s good. At any time at or
before that there is a contract in force (perhaps the null contract) which may specify
payments which the players must make to each other, as functions of verifiable actions
taken by them. As mentioned above, as long as the game continues the parties
concurrently play a bargaining game over renegotiation of the ruling contract, the
details of which we discuss below. If the contract is renegotiated the bargaining
continues, so the renegotiated contract may itself be renegotiated, and so on ad
infinitum. The verifiable actions are production and acceptance of delivery of goods
in A(θ) as well as transmission of public messages. In other words, the court can tell
whether S has produced a good, what that good was (i.e., its name), and whether B
accepted delivery; furthermore, there is a set of possible messages which the players
can publicly send to each other in such a way that the court can tell that a particular
message was sent. For simplicity, we assume that if a contract specifies that a sum p
must be paid by, say, B to S when a particular sequence of verifiable actions has been
taken, then p is automatically paid at that point. That is, there is no need for the
parties to take actions in order to enforce contracts or to make known to the court
what the currently ruling contract is (so, implicitly, when a contract is renegotiated
the new contract is immediately reported to the court). The investments of the two
parties, the state of the world θ and the bargaining moves (other than acceptance of
a new contract) are not observed by the court.4 Note that a contract cannot compel
either party to take an action, e.g. to produce a specific good a at a specific time.
4Since the court cannot observe θ, it cannot observe A(θ), so it does not know what is feasible.
Nevertheless, if a feasible good a ∈ A(θ) is produced then the court observes that this has happened.
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What it can, however, do is, for example, to compel S to pay B a specific sum if S
does not produce a by a specific time.
Payoffs
Suppose that the investments are (is, ib), the realized state is θ, at time t (t ∈ T )
S produces good a ∈ A(θ), and at time τ (τ ∈ T ′(t)) B accepts delivery. Suppose
also that B makes a sequence of net payments to S of p1, p2, p3, ... at dates t1, t2, t3, ....
Then B’s payoff is
v(is, ib, θ, a)δ
τ−1 −∑
i
piδ
ti−1 − ψb(ib)
and S’s payoff is
−c(is, ib, θ, a)δt−1 +
∑
i
piδ
ti−1 − ψs(is).
where v, the value of the good to B, is a non-negative function, c, the cost of the
good’s production to S, is a strictly positive function and δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount
factor (the discount factors are taken to be equal for simplicity). If, given (is, ib, θ)
and the above sequence of net payments, there is no production, then their payoffs
are respectively −∑i piδti−1 − ψb(ib) and ∑i piδti−1 − ψs(is). Finally, if S produces a
at t and B does not accept delivery, then their payoffs are respectively
−∑
i
piδ
ti−1 − ψb(ib)
and ∑
i
piδ
ti−1 − c(is, ib, θ, a)δt−1 − ψs(is).
Any payment from another source (e.g., the return of a cash deposit) enters the payoff
function in the same way as a payment by the other party.
Efficient Actions
Given (is, ib, θ) ∈ <+ ×<+ ×Θ, let a(is, ib, θ), the efficient good, be a solution to
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the problem
max
a∈A(θ)
δγv(is, ib, θ, a)− c(is, ib, θ, a)
where γ is the minimum delay between production and acceptance of delivery (for
example γ = 1 if, after production at t, acceptance of delivery can happen at or after
t+1). We assume that, for each (is, ib, θ) ∈ <+×<+×Θ, a solution to this problem
exists. This would be guaranteed if, for example, A(θ) were a finite set for each θ. We
assume also that at least one element of A(θ) gives a non-negative surplus. This is
essentially without loss of generality because we can always define an arbitrarily fixed
sum of money as one of the “goods” in A(θ), and assume that if S delivers this to
B then B can accept it (verifiably) without delay. In that case the “produced” good
generates a zero surplus. Where the investments and state (is, ib, θ) are understood,
we will sometimes denote the value and cost of a good a ∈ A(θ) by v(a) and c(a)
respectively.
Let
σ(is, ib, θ) = δ
γv(a(is, ib, θ))− c(a(is, ib, θ)).
σ(is, ib, θ) is therefore the ex post surplus available if the investments and state of the
world are (is, ib, θ), gross of investment costs and evaluated at a time when production
is feasible. We assume that the expected gross surplus Eθσ(is, ib, θ) exists for each
(is, ib) and is strictly increasing in is and ib and that a solution exists for the problem
max
is,ib
δ2Eθσ(is, ib, θ)− ψs(is)− ψb(ib)
subject to is ∈ <+, ib ∈ <+. This would be ensured, for example, if Eθσ(is, ib, θ) were
bounded and concave and ψs and ψb were unbounded and convex.
We denote the first-best investment levels, the solution to the above problem, by
(i∗s, i
∗
b) and we make the following assumption, which guarantees that the problem is
not trivial.
Eθδ
2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(i∗s)− ψb(i∗b) > 0. (1)
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Relation to the Literature
Before completing the description of the game by discussing how renegotiation of
contracts may take place, let us digress in order to relate the game to the existing
literature. The model is general enough to incorporate as special cases many of the
standard models found in the literature on incomplete contracts5, some of which are
outlined below.
(1) Suppose that there is a single indivisible good to be traded, there is no ex-
ogenous uncertainty, the buyer’s value for the good v is an increasing function of the
buyer’s investment and the seller’s cost of production c is a decreasing function of the
seller’s investment. This is a version of the classic hold-up model (for an early treat-
ment of the hold-up problem see, e.g., Williamson (1983)). The model above reduces
to this if Θ and A are singletons, v(is, ib, θ, a) depends only on ib and c(is, ib, θ, a)
depends only on is.
(2) Suppose that the model is as in (1) except that Θ ⊆ <n is not a singleton, the
buyer’s value v varies with θ and ib but not with is and the seller’s cost c varies with
θ and is but not with ib. Then we have a version of the model of Hart and Moore
(1988)6. In this case the value and cost, conditional on the investments, are random
variables.
(3) Letting v vary with is as well as ib and θ and letting c vary with ib as well
as with is and θ gives, inter alia, a version of the “cooperative” investment model of
Che and Hausch (1999). In this case the expectation of the buyer’s value for the good
may be increased by an increase in the seller’s investment and, similarly, the seller’s
cost of production may be reduced by an increase in the buyer’s investment. That is,
there are bilateral externalities involved in the choice of investments.
(4) Suppose, as in Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999), that one indivisible
good will be traded but that there are many possible versions of it (“widgets”) and
5Although we have been more specific about the timing of production and delivery than many
of the papers referred to below.
6As we discuss below, however, Hart and Moore make different assumptions about contractibility.
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it is not known ex ante which of these widgets should be traded if total surplus is to
be maximized. This can be accommodated by letting A = W where W is the set of
widgets, and letting v(is, ib, θ, a) depend on (ib, θ, a) and c(is, ib, θ, a) on (is, θ, a).
Most of the results in fact would apply equally in a model considerably more
general than the one above but we concentrate on this one in order to simplify the
exposition. For example, one could allow the parties to produce and consume vari-
able quantities of the good rather than a single indivisible good (as in, for example,
Edlin and Reichelstein (1996)). Indeed, one could consider, rather than a model of
production and trade, one in which the parties each take general multi-dimensional
actions.
Furthermore, the results of this paper extend to the case of multi-dimensional
investments as well as to the case in which one or more of the parties is risk-averse.
Contracts
As noted above, a contract specifies what payments must be made by one party
to the other, as a function of events which can be verified by the court. The sets of
contracts which the parties may propose in the renegotiation process are referred to
as C1 (for renegotiation proposals made before θ is realized at date 2) and C2 (for
proposals made after θ is realized). We assume that after date 2 the elements of A
are describable (this is the assumption commonly made in the incomplete contracts
literature) and that C2 includes any contract of the following form: ‘if S produces
and delivers a, B must pay a price p to S, and if S does not do so by date τ then
S pays a penalty P to B’, where τ is a specified date, p and P specified amounts,
and a is a specified good.7 Such contracts are referred to below as forcing. In effect,
such contracts are specific performance contracts, as allowed, for example, by ADR
and No¨ldeke-Schmidt. Our contractibility assumptions are therefore different from
those of Hart and Moore (1988), who assume that the court can observe whether
trade took place but not who was responsible for a failure of trade. Unlike contracts
7Note that the contract names this good. It cannot say “produce the efficient good” because the
court, not knowing (is, ib, θ), does not know which one is efficient.
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in C2, contracts in C1 might not be able to include references to the potential goods
because it may be that before θ is realized the goods are not describable.8
Contracts may also specify that the parties may send verifiable messages to each
other. For example, the contracts described in the next section, which are used to
generate the first-best, allow one party to send a verifiable message at or just after
time t = 2 (after θ is learned) which nominates which good should be produced
and what the terms of trade should be. The payments subsequently enforced by
the contract will depend on what this message was. We assume that contractual
payments cannot depend on verifiable messages sent before the contract was agreed.
Finally, we assume in the next section that it is possible at date 0 for one or both
parties to deposit a sum of money which will be returned to that party if and only if
certain verifiable events have happened. They can also commit to pay such a deposit
at a specified date in the future. One can suppose, for example, that the deposit
is held by the court, or by a court-appointed lawyer; alternatively, it might be held
by the other party. For simplicity, we assume that a deposit can be released only at
dates when production of goods is feasible.
Renegotiation
The parties can always renegotiate the contract, if any, which they signed at date 0
or any subsequent date, and negotiate a contract if none is currently in force. The way
the renegotiation works is that as play proceeds proposal decision nodes repeatedly
arrive, at each of which one player chooses a contract9 (possibly the current ruling
contract) from the exogenously given set C1 (if θ has not yet been realized) or C2 (if
it has) to propose to the other player, and the other player must immediately accept
or reject this proposal. If the responding player accepts, then the proposed contract
replaces the current ruling contract and, if not, the current contract remains in force.
The disadvantage of a non-cooperative game-theoretic analysis is that the results
8For discussions of the idea that incompleteness of contracts is related to inability to describe
contingencies in advance, and that this indescribability problem leads to inefficiency, see Maskin and
Tirole (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999).
9Alternatively, we could assume that the proposer offers a menu of contracts for the responder
to select from.
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may be sensitive to the precise formulation of the extensive form - who can make
proposals when, etc. Therefore, rather than setting out a particular extensive form,
we will analyze a large class of extensive forms, varying in the fine detail of precisely
when proposals can be made, how these dates relate to dates at which production
decisions can be made and verifiable messages sent, and how the proposer is chosen.
The identity of the proposer at a proposal node is some unspecified function (possibly
random) of the history so far, as is the date of the proposal node itself. It is assumed
that it is impossible to take any action in between a proposal node and the following
response node. We assume also that the game does not have simultaneous moves: for
example, it is not possible to make or accept a renegotiation proposal at the same
time as either player produces a good or sends a verifiable message. Renegotiation
opportunities are frequent in the sense that, for any history, a proposal node will be
reached within one period regardless of the continuation strategies played, assuming
the game lasts that long. The rules of the renegotiation process are constrained by
two assumptions (Assumptions 1 and 2).
Assumption 1 (Weakly Exogenous Renegotiation): The rules governing when
proposals can be made, and the identity of the proposer at a proposal node, are inde-
pendent of past contract proposals and of past and current ruling contracts.
For the purposes of this assumption, deposits are to be understood as elements
of contracts - that is, the renegotiation rules are independent of the size or timing of
any past deposits. The assumption implies that the parties cannot write contracts
which alter the underlying renegotiation game. It still, however, allows for a good
deal of flexibility in the modeling of the renegotiation process. For example, the
renegotiation protocol (who makes the next proposal and when) may vary with θ,
with the production decision made, if any, with past verifiable messages, with past
proposal dates and the identity of the proposer at those dates (although not the
proposals made), and indeed with the investments made at the outset of the game.
Let the overall game (including investment, production, acceptance of delivery,
bargaining moves, etc.) be denoted by Gr(α0), where α0 is the initial contract. Thus,
14
G(α0) represents the game in which renegotiation is not possible and so the contract in
force is always α0, and G
r(α0) represents the game in which renegotiation is possible.
Example: As an illustrative example, consider the following alternating-offers
bargaining protocol. Suppose that α0 is the null contract and the players cannot
renegotiate until after θ is realized. The set of contracts C2 which a player can
propose after t = 2 are the forcing contracts plus contracts of the form ‘if S produces
the good a then B pays p to S and otherwise no payment is due’. We refer to the
latter as option contracts. Suppose that production can take place at any integer time
t ≥ 3 and that, when production has taken place, delivery can be accepted at any
later integer time. At date t = 3 (just before the first production node) B proposes a
contract and S immediately either accepts or rejects it. If the contract is rejected by
S then, at date t = 4, if the game has not yet ended, S proposes a contract which B
immediately accepts or rejects. If this contract is rejected then B proposes at t = 5,
and so on, proposals and responses always just preceding production dates. While
this bargaining proceeds, the players make decisions about whether to produce and,
if production has taken place, whether to accept delivery.
This game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium continuation outcome after θ
is realized. In this outcome, the parties immediately agree on a contract to trade the
efficient good at a price which splits the surplus σ(is, ib, θ) according to the Rubinstein
shares. At any history at which no contract is in place, if a proposal is rejected, then S
does not produce, but waits to the next proposal date. Off the equilibrium path there
are multiple equilibrium continuations. To see this, suppose that, as a result of one or
more deviations, an option contract has been accepted to produce the efficient good a
at a price p such that c(a) < p < pb, where pb is the price offered in equilibrium by B
(i.e., pb = δ(δv(a)− c(a))(1+ δ)−1+ c(a)). Then there is an equilibrium continuation
in which S does not produce and bargaining continues as if there is no contract,
but there is also an equilibrium continuation in which S always produces, if she has
not done so yet, at the next production node and B refuses any renegotiation offer
involving a price above p (cf. Shaked (1994)). At any history at which some inefficient
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non-equilibrium contract has been proposed and accepted, this contract defines the
outside options and hence the shares of the surplus which the players receive in the
continuation. If S deviates by producing a good a before agreement is reached on a
contract then the surplus over which they subsequently bargain is v(a).
It will be convenient to define a related game, denoted Gr(α0, K), in which the
buyer is obliged, at date t = 3, just before the production node, to deposit a monetary
sum K which is returned to the buyer if and when a good is produced. Otherwise,
Gr(α0, K) is the same as G
r(α0). Thus, in addition to the surplus which the players
can generate by investing and producing, there is a (non-interest-bearing) monetary
surplus of valueK which is effectively under the joint control of the parties. Therefore,
as well as bargaining over what surplus to produce and how to share it, they are also
bargaining over how to share the pie K (the respective shares being determined by
the negotiated price). The assumption, as in the case of a deposit which is part of an
initial or negotiated contract, is that the surplus K can be released only at dates at
which production is feasible. The game Gr(α0, 0) is equivalent to G
r(α0).
Before stating Assumption 2 we need some further notation.
Histories The set of finite-length histories of Gr(α0, K) is denoted by H
r(α0, K).
The corresponding set of histories of G(α0) is denoted by H(α0). A history does
not include the sequence of ruling contracts, but the latter can be deduced from
a history, given the initial contract. At any stage, both players know the current
history, so that any finite-length history defines a continuation subgame. For any
finite history, subgame-perfect continuation equilibria are defined in the usual way.
Henceforth the term equilibrium will refer to subgame-perfect equilibrium. For any
h ∈ Hr(α0, K)⋃H(α′0), the length of h (i.e., the date of the decision node after the
last action in h) is t(h), the contract in force at the end of h is α(h), a(h) is the good
that has been produced (if no good has been produced yet then a(h) = ∅) and the
investments and (if t(h) ≥ 2) the state are is(h), ib(h), and θ(h). Given a history
h ∈ Hr(α0, K), h′ ∈ Hr(α0, K) is a history subsequent to h if h and h′ coincide up to
t(h).
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Equivalence of Histories If all renegotiation moves (i.e. proposals and acceptances
or rejections) are removed from h˜ ∈ Hr(α0) then one obtains a history of the game
G(α0). Let z(h˜) refer to this history. That is, z(h˜) is a description of all the non-
bargaining moves made since the start of the game. Two histories h ∈ Hr(α0, 0)
and h′ ∈ H(α′0) are said to be equivalent if α(h) = α′0 and z(h) = h′. Similarly,
two histories h ∈ Gr(α0, K) and h′ ∈ Gr(α′0, K) are equivalent if α(h) = α(h′) and
z(h) = z(h′). Two equivalent histories therefore differ only insofar as the bargaining
moves differ. They both, however, have the same ruling contract.
Efficient Outcomes Given any history h ∈ Hr(α0, K)⋃H(α′0), such that t(h) ≥ 2,
a continuation path is ex post efficient if the following conditions hold: (i) if a(h) = ∅
then the efficient good a(is(h), ib(h), θ(h)) is produced and accepted at the earliest
opportunity; (ii) if a(h) = a then B accepts delivery of a at the earliest opportunity;
and (iii) the monetary surplusK, if relevant, and the cash deposits, if any, are returned
at the earliest opportunity to the players (and there are no payments to third parties).
A subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium is efficient if it gives probability one to
ex post efficient continuation paths. Note that an efficient continuation path need not
be efficient ex ante because the investments made in h may have been suboptimal, or
the wrong good may have been produced. A pure strategy profile for the whole game
(starting at t = 1) is efficient if the outcome prescribed by the profile has investments
(i∗s, i
∗
b), has no payments to third parties and no deposits before date t = 3, and gives
probability 1 to efficient continuation paths after θ is realized at date t = 2.
Available Surplus The available surplus at h, denoted by µ(h), is the sum of the
continuation payoffs which the two players get in an ex post efficient continuation path
(gross of sunk payments, i.e., investment costs, sunk production costs and payments of
deposits). Thus, if, for example, no good has yet been produced, deposits totallingM
have not yet been returned (but are jointly under the control of the two parties10), and
production is feasible without delay, then the available surplus is σ(is(h), ib(h), θ(h))+
M .
Our second key assumption about Gr(α0, K) is as follows.
10For example, the parties have not previously signed the rights away to a third party.
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Assumption 2 (Efficient Renegotiation): For some λb ∈ (0, δ) the following is
true. For any K ≥ 0 and any history h ∈ Hr(∅, K) such that the investments have
been made but there has not yet been a renegotiation proposal opportunity, there is a
subgame-perfect continuation equilibrium s such that (i) agreement is reached, at the
earliest feasible date after θ is realized, on an ex post efficient forcing contract; (ii)
at every subsequent history h′ ∈ Hr(∅, K) such that no contract has been negotiated
and there is no outstanding contract proposal, agreement is reached on an ex post
efficient forcing contract at the earliest feasible date (after θ is realized); and (iii) B’s
expected payoff after every such subsequent history h′ ∈ Hr(∅, K) is less than or equal
to λbµ(h
′).
Efficient Renegotiation says the following. Suppose that, just after the investments
have been made, there is no contract currently in force and no outstanding contract
offer. Then the renegotiation game will have an efficient continuation equilibrium
(we may take it that, in this equilibrium, the parties wait until θ is realized before
negotiating an efficient contract). Secondly, at any future date in which no contract
has yet been negotiated, and no offer is outstanding, there will be an approximately11
efficient continuation equilibrium. Thirdly, at any such stage the buyer’s equilibrium
share of the available surplus is no more than λb. The assumption therefore rules
out a bargaining game in which B gets all the surplus (say, because B makes all the
offers); we deal with that case separately in Section 4 below (see Proposition 3). The
requirement of efficiency is unexceptionable: the normal presumption in a complete
information framework is that the parties will negotiate to the Pareto frontier. All
that we require here is that the complete information bargaining game has at least
one equilibrium with this property. It is easy to check that the assumption is satisfied
by the alternating offers game.
Preliminary Results
In constructing equilibria, one needs to be sure that equilibrium exists in every
11Efficiency is only approximate because an opportunity to produce may pass before there is a
chance to negotiate a contract.
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subgame. Since a specific extensive form has not been explicitly defined (including,
in particular, the set of allowable contracts) we cannot appeal to standard existence
theorems. However, as the following Lemma will imply, existence is guaranteed by
Assumptions 1 and 2.
Lemma 1: Take any history h′ ∈ Hr(α0, K) such that a renegotiation proposal has
just been accepted. There exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the ensuing subgame.
Proof: see Appendix.
The next result says that if in some equilibrium the current contract is always ex
post efficient then there is an equilibrium in which this contract is not renegotiated.
Proposition 1: Take any history h ∈ H(α0) with t(h) ≥ 2 for which there is a
pure strategy continuation equilibrium s(h) of G(α0), starting from h, such that (i)
the continuation outcome path of s(h) is ex post efficient, and (ii) the continuation
outcome path of s(h) at every history subsequent to h is ex post efficient. Let h′ ∈
Hr(α′0) be a history of G
r(α′0) in which there is no outstanding offer and which is
equivalent to h. Then there is a continuation equilibrium s′(h′) of Gr(α′0) starting
from h′ in which there is no renegotiation and the continuation payoffs for each player
in s(h) are equal to the corresponding payoffs in s′(h′).
Proof: see Appendix.
The idea of the proof is straightforward. Take the game in which renegotiation
is not allowed and consider a history h in which θ has been realized. Suppose that
there is a continuation equilibrium s which is (ex post) efficient, starting at the cur-
rent date, and which also prescribes efficient continuation play at every subsequent
possible history. Then, in the game in which renegotiation is allowed, at a history
which is equivalent to h, it is open to the players to play exactly as in s, as far
as production, acceptance of delivery and verifiable messages are concerned, and to
refuse to renegotiate unless offered something which gives a higher payoff than s does.
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Since s is always efficient, it would then be impossible to offer a renegotiation which
is both profitable to the offeror and acceptable to the responder. Hence there is an
equilibrium which is equivalent to s.12 For example, suppose that in the alternating-
offers protocol the current contract says that ‘S is paid p by B if S produces a at
any time, and no payment is due if a is not produced’, where a is the efficient good
and p > c(a). Then, if renegotiation is not allowed, there is trivially a continuation
equilibrium in which, if no production has yet taken place, S produces and delivers a
at the first opportunity. And, in the game with alternating-offers renegotiation, there
is a continuation equilibrium in which, as long as there has been no renegotiation
and no production, S produces a at the next feasible production date and each party
always proposes the current contract. For example, if S proposes a higher price, B
will reject because he knows that he will get the good for p anyway at the earliest
technologically feasible opportunity; if B proposes a lower price, S will reject for a
similar reason. Rejecting a renegotiation offer does not destroy surplus because the
existing contract already gives rise to efficient behavior. It is likely that Proposition
1 applies in a substantially wider class of bargaining processes than considered here:
indeed it should apply in any extensive form which respects the voluntary character
of renegotiation.
Though simple, Proposition 1 has strong implications which have been overlooked
in the literature. We will see that it implies that bargaining games in the class
considered here will have multiple equilibria when there is already a contract a place,
if it is an option contract. This is incompatible with the assumption usually made
that there is a unique outcome of contract renegotiation.
3 Efficient Equilibrium
If the parties do not negotiate a contract before they invest then, in general, the
12This does not contradict the familiar result that prohibiting renegotiation makes it easier to
implement the first-best. Prohibiting renegotiation has bite only if the efficient equilibrium has
some continuation equilibrium (necessarily off the equilibrium path) which is inefficient; at such a
contingency the parties would renegotiate if they could.
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equilibrium outcome of the game will be inefficient - there will be underinvestment.
Suppose, for example, that renegotiation takes place according to the alternating
offers protocol. There is nothing to be gained by negotiating a contract before θ is
realized. After that, there is an essentially unique equilibrium in which the parties
agree a forcing contract to produce the good immediately and the ex post surplus is
divided according to the Rubinstein shares. It is clear that the parties, knowing this,
will invest less than is socially optimal. This is the standard hold-up problem, and
the fact that the seller is able in this model to delay production does not remove it,
in the absence of a contract.
Nevertheless, in this section we show that there will be an efficient subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game as long as the initial contract is appropriately designed.
Assume that B has liquid wealth of at least M available to leave as a deposit, where
M satisfies the inequality
M ≥ max[ ψs(i
∗
s)
δ3(1− λb) ,
ψs(i
∗
s)
δ(δ − λb) ]. (2)
In many standard bargaining games (e.g. variants of the alternating offers game)
λb can be taken to be approximately
1
2
if δ is close to 1. In that case, the required
lower bound is at most approximately 2ψs(i
∗
s).
The contract used to generate the first-best equilibrium will be denoted αb(M)
and is defined as follows.
αb(M): B commits to deposit M at date 3. At date 2, after learning θ, B may
verifiably specify a good ab and a price p. If at any date t ≥ 3, S produces good ab
then B must pay p to S. In that event, B’s deposit is returned to him. If S produces
and delivers a 6= ab, B gets the deposit back and neither is obliged to pay anything to
the other. If S never produces anything, B does not get his deposit back and neither
party is obliged to pay anything to the other.
Note that this contract does not include any descriptions of goods, so that it can
be implemented even if the goods are not describable until date 2. It also has the
important advantage of simplicity. It combines the features of an option contract
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(the seller has the option, exercisable at any date, of producing at a specified price)
with a partial authority contract (the buyer is given the right to set the terms of the
option). The party with authority also has to post a bond (in effect, give a hostage);
this will have the effect of giving him the incentive to behave in the appropriate way.
Construction of the equilibrium
First we prove two Lemmas which exhibit two kinds of continuation equilibria
obtainable when the contract is αb(M), the first derived from Proposition 1 and the
second from Assumption 2.
Lemma 2: Consider any history h ∈ Hr(αb(M), 0) such that (i) there has been no
renegotiation of αb, (ii) B has nominated the efficient good a = a(is(h), ib(h), θ(h))
and a price p ≥ c(a), (iii) no good has been produced and (iv) there is no outstanding
renegotiation offer. There is an efficient continuation equilibrium beginning at h in
which the payoffs are δτ (p− c(a)) for S and δτ (M + δγv(a)− p) for B, where τ is the
time until the next production opportunity.
Proof: If renegotiation were not possible then, at any history in which B has
nominated a and price p ≥ c(a) there would be a pure strategy continuation equilib-
rium in which S produces a at the next opportunity, because delay can only reduce her
payoff. Similarly, B accepts delivery at the first opportunity since v(a) ≥ 0 so, if a is
the efficient good, this equilibrium is efficient after every history. h ∈ Hr(αb(M), 0) as
described in the statement of the Lemma is equivalent to such a history of G(αb(M))
so, by Proposition 1, there is an efficient continuation equilibrium beginning at h in
which there is no renegotiation and S produces a at the first opportunity, giving the
payoffs as described. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: Consider any history h ∈ Hr(αb(M), 0) such that (i) αb has not been
renegotiated, (ii) the date at which B is supposed to nominate a good has passed and
B has either specified a good a and a price p such that p ≤ c(a)+δ(1−λb)(M+σ(h)),
or else has not specified any good, (iii) S has not yet produced a good, and (iv) there is
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no outstanding offer. There exists an efficient continuation equilibrium s˜(h) in which
B’s payoff pib(s˜(h)) satisfies
pib(s˜(h)) ≤ λb[M + σ(is(h), ib(h), θ(h))]
and S’s payoff pis(s˜(h)) satisfies
pis(s˜(h)) ≥ δ(1− λb)[M + σ(is(h), ib(h), θ(h))] .
Proof: see Appendix.
The idea behind Lemma 3 is simple. Suppose that the efficient good has surplus
equal to 1 (v = 1.5 and c = 0.5) and that B has nominated the efficient good and
price 0.75, which would give S a payoff equal to 0.25. Suppose, moreover, that the
renegotiation game is such that if there had been no contract the surplus would have
have been split equally, i.e. they would have agreed to produce the efficient good at
price 1. Under the contract αb(M), there is an equilibrium in which S holds out for
half of the surplus, since she is not obliged to produce. Moreover, the surplus includes
the deposit M since, if S does adopt this strategy, B will not get the deposit back
until agreement is reached. So, if, say, M = 2, they will negotiate a new contract in
which the efficient good is traded at price 2 and B gets his deposit back.
The continuation equilibria in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 can be used to construct
an ex ante efficient equilibrium, as the next Proposition shows.
Proposition 2: If the initial contract is αb(M) and the renegotiation process
satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2 then there is an equilibrium in which both parties invest
and trade efficiently. That is, Gr(αb(M)) has an efficient subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof: Define a strategy profile sˆ as follows. Let t1 be the date at which B is
supposed to nominate a good.
(a) At date 1, B invests i∗b and S invests i
∗
s.
(b) At any renegotiation proposal node before t1 at which no renegotiation proposal
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has been accepted before, the proposer proposes αb, i.e., ‘no renegotiation’.
(c) At date t1, given that there has been no renegotiation so far,
(i) if S has invested i∗s and B has invested ib, B specifies the efficient good
a(i∗s, ib, θ) and price p = c(a(i
∗
s, ib, θ)) + δ
−2ψs(i∗s);
(ii) if the investments were (is, ib) for is 6= i∗s, B specifies the efficient good
a(is, ib, θ) and price p = c(a(is, ib, θ));
(d) Consider three types of history following those in (c) above:
(i) if B has followed the rule given in (c), play the continuation strategy profile
specified in Lemma 2.
(ii) if B has deviated from the rule in (c) and has named a good a and price p ≤
c(a) + δ−2ψs(i∗s) or else has not named any good or price, play the continuation
strategy profile specified in Lemma 3.
(iii) if B has deviated in any other way from the rule in (c), play an arbitrary
continuation equilibrium of the subgame in which an equivalent contract has
just been accepted: this exists by Lemma 1.
(e) At any history before date t1 at which a renegotiation proposal has just been
accepted for the first time, play an arbitrary continuation equilibrium profile:
this exists by Lemma 1.
(f) At any response node before date t1, at which no previous renegotiation proposal
has been accepted, the responder accepts the proposal if and only if doing so
gives the responder strictly higher continuation payoff than does rejecting, where
the continuation payoffs are defined implicitly by (b)-(e) above.
This completes the description of sˆ. The outcome path of sˆ is that both players invest
the first-best amount, there is no renegotiation, B nominates the efficient good and a
price which covers S’s investment cost, and S then produces this good for this price,
B’s deposit being returned as soon as it is made. Clearly sˆ is efficient.
The continuation strategy profiles described in (d)(i) are equilibria by Lemma 2.
Those in (d)(ii) are equilibria by Lemma 3, since δ−2ψs(i∗s) < δ(1−λb)(M +σ(h)) by
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(2). Those in (d)(iii) and (e) are equilibria by construction. The responder at a node
as described in (f) cannot profit by a one-shot deviation.
Consider a history h as described in (c)(i). B’s payoff if he conforms to sˆ is at
least
δ(M + σ(i∗s, ib(h), θ(h))− δ−2ψs(i∗s))
since production takes place within at most one period. If B deviates as in (d)(ii) his
payoff is at most
λb(M + σ(i
∗
s, ib(h), θ(h)))
which is less by (2), given that λb < δ and σ ≥ 0. If B deviates as in (d)(iii) S gets
at least as much as if B had not deviated, since she has the option of producing and
getting at least as high a profit margin; therefore B cannot benefit. At a history h
as described in (c)(ii), B obtains all the surplus if he conforms to sˆ and he cannot
deviate in such a way that S gets a negative continuation payoff. Therefore deviation
is not profitable.
At a renegotiation node as described in (b) the continuation equilibrium is efficient
if there is no renegotiation, and unaffected by any rejected proposal. Therefore, by
(f), a proposal will only be accepted if it strictly reduces the payoff of the proposer
and so the behaviour described in (b) is optimal.
It is optimal for S to invest i∗s because, if she does so, her net payoff, given any
θ, will be δ2(p − c(a(i∗s, i∗b , θ))) − ψs(i∗s) = 0 by (a), (b), (c)(i) and (d), whereas if
she deviates, she can get at most zero, by (b), (c)(ii) and (d). Now consider B’s
investment decision. If B invests ib, then his expected payoff is
δ2Eθσ(i
∗
s, ib, θ)− ψs(i∗s)− ψb(ib) + δ2M (3)
since at date 3 he will get all the available surplus (including the return of his deposit)
less the price ψs(i
∗
s) (in present value terms) which he will pay for the efficient good.
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Since i∗b maximizes the net social surplus, this is his optimal choice.
This establishes that sˆ is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
The logic of the argument13 is that, given initial contract αb(M), there will be
multiple equilibria in the renegotiation game which is played after the investments
have been made and the state of the world is known. These equilibria can then be
exploited (i) to punish S if she does not invest the efficient amount at date 1, and (ii)
to punish B if he tries to improve his position by abusing his authority. The role of
the deposit is to increase the size of the possible punishment.14 B has an incentive
to invest the efficient amount because the contract makes him the residual claimant.
Note that since the game is not repeated (production takes place at most once) this
result is not due to Folk Theorem considerations.
The result is very different from those found in the hold-up literature. The reason
for the difference is that previous papers assume that there is a unique renegotiation
outcome (which appears to be consistent with the fact that many standard bargain-
ing games have a unique equilibrium). The argument here is that, given a certain
type of initial contract, there will be multiple equilibria in most non-cooperative
infinite-horizon models of renegotiation. There is an important difference between
the situation under study here and the one studied in standard bargaining models:
there is a pre-existing contract. Moreover, this contract is so constructed that one
party is allowed, unilaterally, to realize the efficient surplus at any time at which
it is technologically feasible to do so. In the usual models of bargaining, neither
side can create the surplus unless the parties have reached an agreement; in the case
studied here, by contrast, they have already reached a legally enforceable agreement
about how to split the surplus and one party has been given an option to trigger this
outcome at any date.
Our assumptions about the renegotiation process have ruled out games with con-
13Since S’s payoff in equilibrium is zero, her equilibrium strategy is weakly dominated by one in
which she invests zero. However, a slight adjustment to the strategies (giving S a small positive
surplus) gives an equilibrium in undominated strategies.
14The contracts in ADR also use deposits to alter the bargaining powers. In their case, however,
the idea is to drive one party’s bargaining power to zero.
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tinuous time, simultaneous moves and open offers (that is, a responder cannot wait
before deciding whether to accept an offer of a new contract), as well as games in
which the parties have to decide which contract to show to the court. It seems prob-
able, however, that the results above are robust to some, at least, of these extensions.
A renegotiation game in which the equilibrium outcome is unique (when the contract
is αb) would have to have the feature that at some date t the seller is not able unilat-
erally to exercise the option and so realize the surplus σ in the current period, but she
can offer B an agreement generating a joint surplus at t. For example, in the Rubin-
stein model uniqueness of equilibrium derives from the property that if a responder
accepts a proposal then surplus is created at t, but if this proposal is rejected then
no surplus can be created until some time after t. But if there is no technological
obstacle to producing at t (and how otherwise could S offer a payoff pair at t?) there
can be no reason why the option could not be exercised at t. Once one allows exercise
of the option at any date at which surplus could be realized under a renegotiated
contract, one gets equilibria15 of the type described in Proposition 2.
The equilibrium of Proposition 2 is not unique, so that G(αb) implements the
first-best only in a weak sense. The weak notion of implementation is less commonly
used in contract theory than the strong notion and so it may require some justifica-
tion. One reason for allowing a multiplicity of equilibria is that the parties, in the
initial unmodeled negotiation which leads to the contract αb(M), can be regarded
also as agreeing the strategies which they will play in the subsequent game. In other
words, their agreement can be thought of as having two parts: a legally enforceable
part αb(M) and a part which is not legally enforceable (their strategies in the game
Gr(αb(M)) or, conceivably, an agreement about how much payoff each party should
end up with. The agreement as a whole can be regarded as convincing (and so to
describe their subsequent behavior) if the part which is not legally enforceable is self-
enforcing, i.e., if it forms a subgame-perfect equilibrium. The literature on relational
15Another extensive form bargaining game in which there are multiple equilibria is one in which
the players have the option of leaving the relationship at any time. Such an equilibrium would,
however, not be renegotiation-proof because after a party has opted out they could create surplus
by opting back in.
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contracting (Macleod and Malcomson (1989), Levin (2003)) takes a similar approach.
See also the notion of partial contracting in Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (2002).
We have noted that one advantage of the efficient contract αb(M) is its simplicity.
It is also, compared with the mechanisms often found in the classical implementation
literature, relatively realistic. A further advantage is that it is not sensitive to the
details of the cost functions, the renegotiation process, or the way in which future
surplus depends on the investments. In the ADR analysis, by contrast, the optimal
contract includes a default outcome which has to be calibrated in such a way that at
the seller’s first-best investment her marginal investment cost is equal to the marginal
benefit of investment, assuming the default outcome happens. In general, as pointed
out by Maskin and Tirole (1999), the incomplete contracts literature assumes that the
parties, even if they cannot specify future outcomes in a contract, are able to foresee
how different possible physical outcomes map into payoffs; in other words they can do
dynamic programming. In the set-up considered here, however, the parties only need
to know what the investments that they want to induce are, and an upper bound
on their cost. The same contract will support these investments for a wide range of
bargaining powers, cost functions, and specifications of the future environment.
4 Liquidity Constrained Agents
The contract αb(M) used above to obtain the first-best equilibrium (Proposition
2) required the buyer to make a deposit. Suppose now that it is not possible to
use deposits because of liquidity constraints, or for some other reason. Under what
circumstances is it possible to achieve the first-best? It turns out that it will still
be possible if the surplus is large enough relative to the size of the investments or if
the bargaining powers are relatively unequal (in particular if one party has all the
bargaining power full efficiency is achievable).
Suppose that a version of Assumption 2 holds for S, with parameter λs ∈ (0, δ).
That is, the game without a contract has an efficient continuation equilibrium and
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in this equilibrium S’s share of the surplus is always16 no more than λs. Define a
contract αs(0), symmetric to αb(0), as follows.
αs(0): At date 2, after learning θ, S may specify a price p and good a. If she does
not do so, there are no contractual payment obligations for either party. If at date
t = 3, S produces the nominated good a and B subsequently accepts delivery then
B must pay p to S, while if B never accepts delivery then neither party is obliged to
pay anything to the other. If S does not produce the nominated good at date 3 then
she pays a large penalty to B.
S is not required to make any deposit under this contract. Like αb, it gives a non-
expiring option to one party (in this case the option to accept delivery at a specified
price) and it gives the other party the right to set the terms of the option (i.e. the
price). We then have the following result.
Proposition 3: (i) Suppose that, for all ib ≤ i∗b ,
Eθσ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(i∗s)− ψb(i∗b) > λbEθσ(i∗s, ib, θ)− ψb(ib). (4)
Then, if δ is close enough to 1, Gr(αb(0)) has an efficient equilibrium.
(ii) Suppose that, for all is ≤ i∗s,
Eθσ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(i∗s)− ψb(i∗b) > λsEθσ(is, i∗b , θ)− ψs(is). (5)
Then, if δ is close enough to 1, Gr(αs(0)) has an efficient equilibrium.
Proof: see Appendix.
Note that (4) holds if
Eθσ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ) >
ψs(i
∗
s) + ψb(i
∗
b)
1− λb
16At least if there is no outstanding offer.
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since Eθσ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ) ≥ Eθσ(i∗s, ib, θ) for all ib ≤ i∗b . In the alternating-offers game, λb
and λs are both approximately equal to 0.5 if δ is close to 1. In that case Proposition
3 implies that the first-best is achievable if the first-best gross expected surplus is
more than twice the cost of the optimal investments. This condition becomes less
restrictive as the bargaining powers become more asymmetric. For example, if B has
all the bargaining power (λs = 0) then, by (1),
Eθσ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ) >
ψs(i
∗
s) + ψb(i
∗
b)
1− λs
is satisfied, so, by Proposition 3(ii), Gr(αs(0)) has an efficient equilibrium if δ is
high.17
In the equilibrium of Proposition 3(i) both parties invest efficiently and B then
nominates the efficient good and gives S a profit margin of
ψs(i
∗
s)σ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ)
δ2Eθσ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
,
which, in expectation, compensates S for her investment. If S underinvests then S is
punished by getting zero gross profit. As in Proposition 2, B is punished for making
the wrong nomination by a renegotiation of the shares of the surplus, but in this case
he is punished in the same way for underinvesting. (4) ensures that this punishment
is strong enough. The equilibrium of Proposition 3(ii) is symmetric. In equilibrium S
nominates the efficient good and a price which gives B enough surplus to compensate
him, in expectation, for his investment. If S deviates then a lower price is negotiated.
Proposition 3 enables us to draw some conclusions about which party should be
given authority. In the model of the previous section, with either party able to make
a sufficiently high deposit, authority could be given to either party since a result
analogous to Proposition 2 can be established with initial contract αs(M), which is
the same as αs(0) except that S makes a deposit of M which is returned only when
B accepts S’s good. However, when neither party is able to make a deposit, (4)
and (5) show that the buyer should have authority if λb is low or when ψs(i
∗
s) is low
17In fact, as the proof shows, δ does not have to be high in this case.
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and, conversely, S should have authority when λs or ψb(i
∗
b) is low. If the seller has a
sufficiently low cost of optimal investment then the buyer will have a lower incentive to
underinvest and take a share λb instead of compensating the seller for her investment
and taking the residual surplus. If the buyer has a low bargaining power then the
threat of renegotiation if he deviates is stronger, so giving him authority is less costly.
5 A Finite Horizon Model with Sequential Investments
The argument in Sections 3 and 4 shows that an efficient equilibrium will exist, given
the right initial contract, if the seller can indefinitely delay production. In many
situations, however, indefinite delay is not possible: production has to take place by
some fixed finite date, or else all possibility of surplus is lost. Even in this case, it is
possible to induce the first-best investments if the two parties can invest sequentially -
i.e., one invests first and the other then invests after observing the first agent’s choice.
This, as above, is despite the fact that the environment may be complex and there
may be direct externalities. In this section we briefly sketch the argument.
Suppose, then, that, instead of having to invest simultaneously at date 1, the two
players are able to invest one after the other. Each can either (i) invest at date 1 or (ii)
having observed whether (and how much) the other player invested at date 1, invest
at date 1 + ε, for 1 > ε > 0. There are no further opportunities to invest. Suppose
also that if production does not take place at date t = 3 then there is no further
production opportunity and so no surplus is created; similarly, if B does not accept
delivery of a produced good at 3 + ε then no value is created (the good perishes).
Assume that there is no discounting. In every other respect the game is as in Section
2; in particular there are frequent opportunities to renegotiate the contract.
Consider first the following contract: ‘S names a price p after θ is realized and
produces a good of her choice. B then has the option of accepting delivery at price
p or not accepting delivery, in which case he does not have to pay anything.’ This
contract will give S all the available surplus. All S has to do is produce the efficient
good and name a price equal to B’s valuation of it. B’s best choice is to accept
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delivery at date t + ε since the alternative would give him zero; knowing this, S
will reject any renegotiation offer by B. At the same time, B’s option not to buy
ensures that he gets at least zero, so we have a unique equilibrium. We can refer to
this as the ‘seller-authority’ contract. Similarly, there is a ‘buyer-authority’ contract
according to which B (after the realization of θ) names a good and a price and S
decides whether or not to produce this good at this price. Again, S will be obliged
to produce at date 3 at cost and so the unique equilibrium is efficient, in this case
giving all the surplus to B.
Now we use an idea employed by Demski and Sappington (1991) and Hermalin
and Katz (1991) in a principal-agent model and by No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1998) in a
property-rights model. Suppose that the initial contract has the following form. We
start with a ‘buyer-authority’ contract, but at or after the first investment stage B
can name a price q at which S has the right to buy B out and change the contract
to a ‘seller-authority’ one. S’s option to buy expires after the last date at which S
can invest and before date 2, when θ is realized. In this game every subgame-perfect
equilibrium is efficient. In equilibrium, B invests i∗b in period 1, while S invests
nothing. B names price q equal to the maximum expected surplus Eθσ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ). S
then finds it optimal to pay q and invest i∗s because she will then be the residual
claimant. B’s initial investment of i∗b is optimal for him because he will be able to
extract all the expected surplus through the option price, so he is the residual claimant
at the outset. There is no renegotiation in equilibrium because the continuation
equilibrium is always efficient.18
The idea of using options in this way is not new, but it seems not to have been
noticed in the literature that if sequential investment is possible, this device solves
the hold-up problem in very general settings, including those in which contracts have
appeared to be powerless.19 Che and Sakovics (2003) show that, in the simplest
18This construction requires the existence of a date at which it is too late to invest but θ is not yet
known and for this date to be known in advance (since the option expires at such a date). Suppose
instead that it is known that such a date will exist, it is not known ex ante when it will be, but the
buyer will know it when it arrives. In that case the contract can stipulate that the option has no
expiry date and that the buyer can cancel the option at any time. He will cancel it if S has failed
to exercise it when the final investment date has passed.
19The approach taken here can encompass all types of surplus-enhancing investments, not just, as
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kind of hold-up setting, efficiency is achievable if there are repeated opportunities to
invest. The result in this section shows that if the parties can write and trade simple
option contracts then the same applies in more general settings, and that only two
investment periods are required.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have analyzed a general buyer-seller hold-up model in which there is symmetric
information and ex post contractible production and trade. The main result is that if
an explicitly non-cooperative approach is taken to the renegotiation process (allowing
the seller to delay production) then there will generally be an efficient equilibrium
even in those settings (direct externalities, complex environments) in which it has
been thought that contracts can achieve nothing. Furthermore, the contracts used
to generate the efficient equilibrium are simple and robust (in the sense that they do
not have to be finely adapted to the cost and payoff functions), and they are similar
to contracts which are frequently observed in practice.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Consider a history h˜ ∈ Hr(∅, K) which is the same as h′ in
every respect except, possibly, bargaining moves. In h˜ there are no accepted rene-
gotiation proposals until the final two nodes, at which point α(h′) is proposed and
accepted. Thus, h˜ and h′ are equivalent: they have the same investments, θ, verifi-
able history and ruling contract. Furthermore, by Assumption 1, the renegotiation
game after h′ is the same as the renegotiation game after h˜. Therefore the subgame
beginning at h is the same as the subgame beginning at h˜. But h˜ is subsequent to a
history h as described in Assumption 2. There is, by Assumption 2, a subgame-perfect
equilibrium in the subgame beginning at h; the profile induced by this equilibrium
in the game following h˜ is then a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, hence a
in No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1998), investments in physical assets.
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subgame-perfect equilibrium in the game starting at h′. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: Define a continuation strategy profile s′(h′) as follows.
Consider three types of subgame (histories subsequent to h′): (i) those in which
there has been no change of contract since h′ (so the contract is α0) and there is no
outstanding offer; (ii) those in which there has been no change of contract since h′
but a new contract has just been proposed; and (iii) those at which a renegotiation
proposal has just been accepted for the first time since h′. For any subgame of type
(iii), there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium by Lemma 1. Select an arbitrary such
equilibrium profile and set s′(h′) equal to this profile in this subgame. For histories
of type (i), s′(h′) is defined as ‘play according to s at non-bargaining nodes, and at
proposal nodes always propose α0 (i.e., no renegotiation)’. For any history of type
(ii), the continuation payoff of the responder if he accepts the proposal is determined
by (iii) above, and, if he rejects the proposal, by (i) above (i.e., the payoffs are given
by s). At this history, the responder’s action specified by s′(h′) is: ‘accept if and only
if the continuation payoff for ‘accept’ is higher than that for ‘reject’ ’. This defines
s′(h′). If the players adopt this profile, there is no renegotiation and the outcome is
the same as the outcome of s. By construction, s′(h′) forms an equilibrium after any
renegotiation. Clearly, neither player can benefit before that by a one-shot deviation
at a response node. To show that s′(h′) is an equilibrium, we need to show that
neither player can deviate profitably at a history of type (i). No deviation which does
not involve a renegotiation proposal can be profitable because s is an equilibrium
in the game without renegotiation. Consider a deviation in which a player makes
a proposal not equal to α0 (i.e., proposes a new contract). Without this deviation,
this player’s continuation payoff would be that corresponding to s. If the proposer
benefits by this deviation, it must be that the responder is worse off, by efficiency of s
in the continuation. But, since the responder can reject the proposal and thus obtain
the continuation payoff corresponding to s, that is impossible. This shows that s′(h′)
is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Take a history h′ ∈ Hr(∅,M) which is equivalent to h, except
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that there has been no renegotiation, so that α(h′) = ∅. Thus, the investments,
state and all verifiable actions (including the deposit of M at date 3) are the same
as in h. By Assumption 1, the game-form after h is the same as that after h′.
Take a continuation profile which leads, at some date t, to the same contract (not
equal to αb(M)), whether the starting point is h or h′. Then the continuation payoff
pair will be the same at those two eventualities (since the continuation game-form,
continuation strategies, ruling contract, payoff structure, and verifiable history will
all be the same). The only difference between the subgame at h and the subgame at
h′ is that, as long as the current contract has not been renegotiated, in the former
S gets paid p if she produces B’s nominated good, whereas in the latter she gets
paid nothing for producing any good, although in both cases B gets his deposit of M
returned in that event.
By Assumption 2, there exists a continuation equilibrium profile s′(h′), starting
at h′, in which agreement is reached at the earliest opportunity on an efficient forcing
contract and in which B’s share of the available surplus is no more than λb at this
point and also at any subsequent point at which no contract has been negotiated and
there is no outstanding contract offer.
Since the game-forms at h and at h′ are identical, s′(h′) is a valid continuation
strategy profile for the game Gr(αb(M), 0), beginning at h. Let s˜(h) = s′(h′). Under
this profile, S does not produce until a new contract is negotiated (otherwise her
payoff in Gr(∅,M) would be zero, contradicting Assumption 2). I will show that it
is an equilibrium profile. Clearly it is an equilibrium after any renegotiation because,
as noted above, the subgame is then the same as the corresponding subgame in
Gr(∅,M). Since future play will be given by s′(h′), the payoffs from rejecting a
renegotiation offer will also be the same as in Gr(∅,M), so the acceptance rules given
by s′(h′) are always optimal. It is only necessary to show that neither player can
deviate profitably at a history h′′ when there has been no renegotiation and there
is no outstanding offer. If the deviation does not involve producing B’s nominated
good then it cannot be profitable because, if it were, then the same deviation would
be profitable in Gr(∅,M), contradicting the fact that s′(h′) is an equilibrium. If
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S produces B’s nominated good a then S gets a payoff of p − c(a), whereas if she
conforms to the strategy given by s′(h′) she gets at least (1−λb)µ(h′′) by Assumption
2. But p− c(a) ≤ δ(1−λb)[M +σ(is(h′′), ib(h′′), θ(h′′))] ≤ (1−λb)µ(h′′) so producing
a is worse for S than not doing so. Therefore s˜(h) is an equilibrium. The bounds
on the equilibrium payoffs follow from Assumption 2 and the fact that at most one
period can elapse before renegotiation and production (and the return of the deposit)
take place. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3(i) Consider a strategy profile s1 as follows (as before, t1
is the date at which the good is nominated).
(a) At date 1, B invests i∗b and S invests i
∗
s.
(b) At any renegotiation proposal node before t1 at which no renegotiation proposal
has been accepted before, the proposer proposes αb(0), i.e., ‘no renegotiation’.
(c) At date t1, given that there has been no renegotiation so far,
(i) If S has invested i∗s and B has invested ib ≥ i∗b , B specifies the efficient good
a(i∗s, ib, θ) and price
p = c(a(i∗s, ib, θ)) +
ψs(i
∗
s)σ(i
∗
s, ib, θ)
Eθδ2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
.
If B has followed this rule, the continuation strategy profile is as specified in
Lemma 2. If B has deviated by making no nomination, or by nominating an
inefficient good, or by nominating a profit margin for S less than
ψs(i
∗
s)σ(i
∗
s, ib, θ)
Eθδ2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
,
the continuation strategy profile is as specified in Lemma 3. If B has deviated by
nominating a higher profit margin, play an arbitrary continuation equilibrium of
the subgame in which an equivalent contract has just been accepted: this exists
by Lemma 1.
(ii) If the investments were (is, ib) for is 6= i∗s, B specifies the efficient good
a(is, ib, θ) and price p = c(a(is, ib, θ)). If B has followed this rule, the contin-
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uation strategy profile is as specified in Lemma 2. If B has deviated, play an
arbitrary continuation equilibrium.
(d) At date t1, given that there has been no renegotiation so far, S has invested i
∗
s
and B has invested ib < i
∗
b :
(i) if B has nominated no good, or has nominated a good and a profit margin for
S less than or equal to δ(1−λb)σ, play the continuation strategy profile specified
in Lemma 3.
(ii) if B has nominated a profit margin for S greater than δ(1 − λb)σ, play an
arbitrary continuation equilibrium profile.
(iii) given (i) and (ii) above, B chooses a good and price (or no nomination) to
maximize his expected continuation payoff.
(e) At any history before date t1 at which a renegotiation proposal has just been
accepted for the first time, play an arbitrary continuation equilibrium profile:
this exists by Lemma 1.
(f) At any response node before date t1, at which no previous renegotiation proposal
has been accepted, the responder accepts the proposal if and only if doing so
gives the responder strictly higher continuation payoff than does rejecting, where
the continuation payoff is defined implicitly by (b)-(e) above.
This describes the profile s1. Note that, for high δ,
ψs(i
∗
s)σ(i
∗
s, ib, θ)
Eθδ2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
< δ(1− λb)σ(i∗s, ib, θ) (6)
by (4) (with ib = i
∗
b). In (c)(i), if B conforms to s
1, S gets (valued at a production
node)
ψs(i
∗
s)σ(i
∗
s, ib, θ)
Eθδ2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
.
If he makes no nomination, or nominates a lower margin, S gets at least δ(1 −
λb)σ(i
∗
s, ib, θ), which is greater by (6), so B must be worse off. He must also be worse
off if he nominates a higher margin.
In (c)(ii), B gets all the surplus if he conforms. Since S must get a non-negative
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continuation payoff after any deviation, B cannot profitably deviate.
The continuation profile after (c)(i) is an equilibrium by (6). The continuations
described in (d) are clearly equilibria.
S’s expected ex post expected surplus if she invests i∗s, discounted to date 1, is
ψs(i
∗
s) as in the proof of Proposition 2, so that i
∗
s is the optimal choice for her.
It remains to show that it is optimal for B to invest i∗b .
If ib ≥ i∗b then B’s expected payoff is
Eθδ
2σ(i∗s, ib, θ)− ψb(ib)−
δ2ψs(i
∗
s)Eθσ(i
∗
s, ib, θ)
δ2Eθσ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
≤ Eθδ2σ(i∗s, ib, θ)− ψb(ib)− ψs(i∗s)
since σ is increasing in ib, and, if he invests i
∗
b his payoff is
Eθδ
2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(i∗s)− ψb(i∗b), (7)
which maximizes the RHS of the above inequality, so i∗b is optimal for B in this range.
If ib < i
∗
b then S gets, ex post, at least
Eθδ
3(1− λb)σ(i∗s, ib, θ)
so B gets, ex ante, at most
Eθδ
2σ(i∗s, ib, θ)− Eθδ3(1− λb)σ(i∗s, ib, θ)− ψb(ib)
= Eθδ
2(1− δ + λbδ)σ(i∗s, ib, θ)− ψb(ib).
If he does not deviate, he gets
Eθδ
2σ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(i∗s)− ψb(i∗b),
which is greater by (4), for high δ. Therefore it is optimal for him to invest i∗b . Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3(ii) (a) Consider a history at which there has been no
renegotiation, there is no outstanding offer, S has named a price p and good a, and
produced a, where p ≤ v(a). There is an ex post efficient continuation equilibrium
in which there is no renegotiation and B accepts delivery of a at the first opportu-
nity, paying price p. This follows from Proposition 1, since if renegotiation were not
possible, there would be an efficient continuation equilibrium equivalent to the above.
(b) Consider a history at which there has been no renegotiation, there is no out-
standing offer, θ has been realized and no good has been produced. From Assumption
2, using arguments analogous to those in the proof of Lemma 3, there is an ex post
efficient continuation equilibrium in which S gets a share at most (approximately) λs
of the surplus. In this equilibrium:
(i) if there is no nomination, there is an ex post efficient continuation in which
the parties negotiate as if there is no contract (and S gets no more than λs of the
surplus).
(ii) If S nominates (p, a) such that v(a) − p ≤ δ(1 − λs)v(a), then B does not
exercise his option and in the renegotiation B gets at least δγδ(1 − λs)v(a) (valued
at date 3).
(iii) if S nominates (p, a) such that v(a) − p > δ(1 − λs)v(a), then there is an
arbitrary continuation equilibrium in which B gets at least δγδ(1− λs)v(a) (since he
can always exercise his option).
(c) Define a strategy profile s2 as follows. At date 1, B invests i∗b and S invests
i∗s. When S is due to nominate a price, given that there has been no renegotiation so
far:
(i) if S has invested is ≥ i∗s and B has invested i∗b , S specifies price
p = v(a(is, i
∗
b , θ)) −
δ−γψb(i∗b)σ(is, i
∗
b , θ)
δ2Eθσ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
;
and the efficient good;
(ii) if the investments were (i∗s, ib) for ib 6= i∗b , S specifies price p = v(a(i∗s, ib, θ))
and the efficient good.
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After (i) or (ii), if there has been no renegotiation and there is no outstanding
offer, S produces the efficient good a(is, ib, θ) and the continuation equilibrium is then
as in (a) above.
If S deviates from any of the above (including by underinvesting), the continuation
equilibrium is as in (b) above, once θ has been realized.
At all other nodes continuation strategies are defined in a similar way to those in
the proof of Proposition 2.
At the history described in (c)(i) above, S’s continuation payoff under s2 is (valued
at a production date)
σ(is, i
∗
b , θ)) −
ψb(i
∗
b)σ(is, i
∗
b , θ)
δ2Eθσ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
;
while, if she deviates, she gets at most λsσ(is, i
∗
b , θ) which is lower by (5) (for is = i
∗
s).
At the history in (c)(ii), her continuation payoff is equal to the available surplus
if she conforms to s2, so deviation is not optimal.
If S invests i∗s, B’s expected continuation payoff is ψb(i
∗
b), so S gets the full surplus.
If she invests is < i
∗
s, her payoff is at most
λsδ
2Eθσ(is, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(is)
so this deviation is suboptimal by (5).
If she invests is ≥ i∗s, her payoff is
Eθδ
2σ(is, i
∗
b , θ)− ψs(is)−
ψb(i
∗
b)Eθσ(is, i
∗
b , θ)
Eθσ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
which is maximized by i∗s. B’s payoff at the outset of the game is
−ψb(i∗b) + δ2+γEθ
δ−γψb(i∗b)σ(i
∗
s, i
∗
b , θ)
δ2Eθσ(i∗s, i
∗
b , θ)
= 0
if he invests i∗b and his continuation payoff is zero if he invests any other amount.
Therefore it is optimal for him to invest i∗b . As in the proof of Proposition 2, the
parties cannot both benefit from renegotiation from αs because the continuation is
always efficient. This establishes that s2 is an equilibrium. Q.E.D.
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